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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 981540-CA 
v. : 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's opening 
brief, the State submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments 
contained in defendant/appellee's responsive brief. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT 
THE ORDER TO DISMISS DOES NOT COMPLY 
WITH STATE V. TROYER, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1980) 
In a single document, the State moved to dismiss this case with prejudice after the 
trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and the trial court 
dismissed the case (R. 67-68) (a copy of the motion and order for dismissal is contained 
in the addendum). On the first page, the dismissal motion clearly states that the 
suppression order substantially impaired the State's ability to proceed and cites State v. 
Troyer, 866 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1993) (R. 67). On the second page, the trial court 
granted the State's motion as follows: "Based on the foregoing Motion and good cause 
appearing therefore, the Court hereby dismisses the above case." (R. 68). 
Notwithstanding, defendant asserts that the trial court's dismissal order is without 
prejudice and otherwise fails to meet the requirements of Troyer. Aple. Br. at 6-7. 
Defendant's contention lacks merit and should be rejected. 
The concern addressed in Troyer was the development of a mechanism that would 
"preserve the State's statutory right to obtain review of suppression orders that amount to 
final judgments and at the same time ensure that defendants will be shielded from 
potential prosecutorial manipulation." Id. at 531. Accordingly, the supreme court held 
that the State would be allowed "to obtain review of suppression orders where they 
substantially impair the prosecution's ability to proceed with a case, " as long as certain 
conditions were met. The first requirement is certification from the trial court that the 
suppression order substantially impaired the State's case. Id. The supreme court noted 
that trial court certification, as opposed to prosecutorial certification, allows defendants a 
chance to object before the dismissal is entered, and yet still permits appellate review. Id. 
Second, the supreme court required the State to request dismissal with prejudice in 
order to obtain review of suppression orders on an appeal of right from a dismissal. Id. at 
531. This requirement prevents the State from refiling charges if the suppression order is 
affirmed on appeal. Id. 
In this case, a single document contains the motion and order. Read in their 
natural context, the trial court's order of dismissal incorporates the Troyer requirements 
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set forth in the State's immediately proceeding motion (R. 68-69). Therefore, it is not 
reasonably argued that the trial court's dismissal order was based on any other grounds 
than those cited in the State's dismissal motion. 
Even if the motion and accompanying order of dismissal could have been more 
artfully drafted, it complies with the policy concerns undergirding Troyer. Indeed, 
nothing prevented defendant from objecting to the motion to dismiss below. Moreover, 
the State views itself as fully bound by the motion and order for dismissal with prejudice, 
and will not seek to refile charges, no matter the appellate outcome. 
Defendant's broad reliance on civil authority fails to demonstrate any basis for 
interpreting the dismissal of this criminal case as other than as a dismissal with prejudice. 
To do so on these facts would be to elevate form over substance. Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531 
n.2. Where, as here, it is clear that the "suppression order destroys the prosecution's 
case," the State may properly seek appellate review. Id. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT 
THE STATE'S ARGUMENT IS UNPRESERVED 
It is uncontested that the missing front license plate on defendant's vehicle 
triggered Trooper Wilson's suspicions of a possibly stolen and/or improperly registered 
vehicle (R. 75: 3-4, 20, 26-27), see Aplt. Br. at add. C. See also Aple. Br. at p. 9. The 
focus in the trial court therefore, was whether Trooper Wilson's suspicions of such were 
reasonable, premised as they were solely on his belief that Wyoming law required the 
display of both front and back license plates. As set forth in the State's opening brief, 
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based on the entirety of the evidence before it, the trial court clearly erred in finding that 
,f[t]he officer's 'assumption' does not support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was 
engaged in criminal activity" (R. 49), add. D. See Aple. Br. at 10-15. 
In claiming that the State's argument regarding the reasonableness of the trooper's 
suspicions is unpreserved, defendant parses out the trooper's suspicions of criminality 
from his "assumption" concerning Wyoming traffic law, claiming that the State relied 
only on the latter argument below. Aple. Br. at 7-8. However, the trooper would have 
had no basis upon which to suspect the vehicle was stolen and/or improperly registered 
absent his belief that Wyoming law required the display of front and back license plates, 
therefore his suspicion of the former cannot be viewed in isolation from his suspicion of 
the latter — they necessarily go hand in hand. 
In arguing the reasonableness of the trooper's suspicions of criminality, the 
prosecutor did rely heavily upon a theory that the missing front plate violated Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-la-1305(5) (1993),1 and that this alone could justify the traffic stop (R. 45-44), 
see Aple Br. at add. B. While the scope of section 41-la-1305 is a close question, it is 
'Section 41-1A-1305(5) provides that 
it is a class C misdemeanor to operate upon any highway of 
this state any vehicle required by law to be registered without 
having the license plate or plates securely attached, and the 
registration card issued by the division carried in the vehicle, 
except that the registration card issued by the division to all 
trailers and semitrailers shall be carried in the towing 
vehicle[.] 
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undisputed that failure to display a front plate is a violation of Wyoming law, an 
argument the prosecutor emphasized in his motion to reconsider (R.61-60), see Aple. Br. 
at add. B. Because Trooper Wilson was correct in his surmise of Wyoming law, his 
suspicion that the missing front plate in this case indicated a possibly stolen or improperly 
registered vehicle was reasonable. See Aplt. Br. at 10-15. If the trooper had been wrong 
as to the requirements of Wyoming law, his suspicion of a stolen and/or improperly 
registered vehicle based on the missing plate would have no basis. See Aplt. Br. at 13. 
For these reasons, the issue as to the reasonableness of the trooper's suspicions of 
criminality is necessarily preserved and should be addressed by the Court. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT 
THE LICENSE PLATE WAS MISSING FOR 
INNOCUOUS AS OPPOSED TO CRIMINAL 
PURPOSES 
Defendant agrees that the basis for the trooper's suspicions of criminality in this 
case was the missing front license plate. Aple. Br. at 9. He asserts, however, that 
because the missing license plate was ultimately discovered on the dash of the car after 
the stop was effected, that there was an innocent explanation which "diluted" the 
reasonableness of the trooper's initial suspicion that the car was stolen and/or improperly 
registered. Aple. Br. at 11. Defendant is mistaken. 
As set forth in the State's opening brief, see Aplt. Br. at 12-13, the fact that a 
suspect's conduct may be consistent with innocent behavior does not vitiate the 
reasonable suspicion of an experienced officer. "To the contrary, where a defendant's 
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conduct is 'conceivably consistent with innocent... activity,' but is also 'strongly 
indicative' of criminal activity, [this Court] will not hesitate to conclude that reasonable 
suspicion exists." Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah 1993). 
Here, the failure to display a front license plate is uniquely indicative of a 
potentially stolen and/or improperly registered vehicle. See Aplt. Br. at 13-15 (citing 
supporting case law). The nature of the missing license plate violation in this case thus 
distinguishes it from Baird, upon which defendant relies. See Aple. Br. At 10. As 
explained in the State's opening brief, the officer's "idle curiosity" in Baird about the 
color of the sticker on the out-of-state license plate was alone inadequate to raise any 
similar reasonable suspicion of a potentially stolen vehicle. Aplt. Br. at 14. This case, 
however, is more akin to State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 n.3 (Utah App. 1992), where 
the trooper properly effected a traffic stop of a vehicle with no license plates to determine 
if the vehicle in fact contained a proper temporary permit. 
Based on the above, the trial court clearly erred in finding that Trooper Wilson 
could not reasonably suspect criminality in this case unless he knew with absolutely 
certainty that Wyoming law required both front and back license plate display. See also 
Aplt. Br. at 10-15. Instead, it is sufficient that in the trooper's experience Wyoming cars 
typically display front and back plates and from that experience he surmised, correctly, 
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that such was required by Wyoming law. Aplt. Br. at 13, add. B (R. 59). The trial court's 
erroneous suppression ruling should be overturned.2 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court should reverse the trial court's suppression of 
evidence and remand this case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on 3 May 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
RIAN DECKER 
ssistant Attorney General 
2Assuming the Court agrees that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, the 
trial court correctly acknowledged that defendant's detention beyond the traffic purpose 
of the stop was valid, based upon the smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. 
Aplt. Br. at 15. As further set forth in the State's opening brief, defendant's subsequent 
consent to search was also valid and there is therefore, no need to remand for findings on 
the validity of his untainted consent to search. Aplt. Br. at 16, n.7. Defendant does not 
contest the validity of the trial court's findings and/or the State's argument in this regard. 
SeeAple. Br. at 6-12. 
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ADDENDUM 
David O. Leavitt, No. 5990 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MOTION AND ORDER OF 
Plaintiff, DISMISSAL 
vs. Criminal No. 971400205 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN, 
Defendant. 
The State of Utah, through the Juab County Attorney, hereby moves the court to dismiss 
the above entitled action against the defendants on the ground that the suppression order will 
substantially impair the prosecution's ability to proceed in the case. See State vs. Troyer, 866 
P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1993). Therefore, the State moves to dismiss the above entitled case with 
prejudice. 
Dated this , L ^ day of J-tpkw, L - ^ . 1998. 
S-o SEP 23 <tf 
1 
David O. Leavitt 
Juab County Attorney 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby 
dismisses the above case. 
' ' >98. Dated this / ? day o f ^ - X U ^ k ^
~* •"-**$- 3 Oil 
District J u d g < y ^ 
CVJ«V 
^7 
